Trump added two demands to his Saudi deal. The kingdom might walk.

Ali Shihabi is a Saudi author and commentator.

Last week, the United States and Saudi Arabia appeared to have resolved one of the most complicated issues that they had been working on for nearly a decade. On July 22, their energy ministers signed a nuclear cooperation agreement that would give American companies a central role in building the kingdom’s civilian nuclear industry.

Within a day, however, President Donald Trump suddenly added two new conditions: Saudi Arabia must join the Abraham Accords between Israel and several Arab countries, and there would be no enrichment of nuclear material inside the kingdom.

That intervention satisfies some domestic political constituencies, but it risks defeating America’s strategic purpose. If Washington makes nuclear cooperation conditional on unrelated political concessions and a permanent Saudi surrender of its fuel-cycle ambitions, Riyadh will not necessarily abandon nuclear power. It may simply seek a partner that asks fewer questions: China.

Saudi Arabia has legitimate reasons to develop nuclear energy. Its population and economy are growing; electricity demand is rising; desalination consumes enormous quantities of energy; and every barrel of oil not needed for domestic power generation can be exported. The kingdom also possesses uranium resources and naturally wants to develop the technical expertise and industrial value chain associated with them. None of this amounts to a decision to build a nuclear weapon.

Washington nevertheless treats Saudi enrichment as a privilege America can grant or withhold. That overestimates American leverage. The U.S. remains the most attractive partner because of its technology, financing, safety culture and political relationship with Riyadh. But it is no longer the only credible supplier. China has built a large domestic reactor fleet, exports nuclear technology, finances infrastructure patiently and rarely attaches demands concerning another country’s foreign policy.

Beijing and Riyadh already have a foundation on which to build. China National Nuclear Corporation has cooperated with Saudi institutions on uranium and thorium exploration, uranium extraction and prospective nuclear projects. A Chinese offer would not be conditioned on Saudi recognition of Israel. Nor is Beijing likely to demand the “gold standard” prohibition on domestic enrichment that Washington has long sought.

China would still have international nonproliferation obligations, and any Saudi program should remain under International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards. But that is precisely the point: The realistic choice is not between an American-designed program with perfect restrictions and no Saudi program at all. It is between an American partnership with exceptional visibility and influence, and an alternative partnership in which Washington has neither.

Linking the nuclear agreement to the Abraham Accords is particularly counterproductive. Saudi Arabia has repeatedly made clear that normalization with Israel requires a credible pathway toward Palestinian statehood. Whatever one thinks of that position, it cannot be erased by attaching Israel to an agreement addressing reactors, electricity and nuclear fuel. Attempting to obtain through nuclear leverage what diplomacy has not achieved will appear less like partnership than coercion.

The enrichment question requires more care, but not an absolute prohibition. Enrichment is dual-use technology. At low levels it produces reactor fuel; at high levels it can contribute to a weapon. That risk is real. The answer should be an arrangement that makes diversion extraordinarily difficult — strict limits on enrichment levels and quantities, continuous monitoring, intrusive inspections, remote surveillance and multinational management.

Such an arrangement would give Washington far more security than driving the entire Saudi fuel cycle into Chinese hands. American participation would shape reactor selection, training, cybersecurity, physical protection, waste management and safeguards for decades. It would bind Saudi and American institutions together and give Congress continuing visibility into the program. Walking away would sacrifice all that influence while doing little to extinguish Saudi ambitions.

There is also a wider geopolitical cost. Washington regularly warns Gulf partners against becoming technologically dependent on China. It cannot then close the American door whenever those partners decline to subordinate their national priorities to American domestic politics. Alliances do not survive when every field of cooperation becomes leverage for a separate demand.

Saudi Arabia would prefer an American nuclear partnership. Its security architecture, investment ties and military relationship remain deeply connected to the United States — as demonstrated just this week by their joint attack on Iran-backed militias in Iraq. But preference should not be confused with dependence. A kingdom determined to acquire civilian nuclear power has alternatives, and China will happily convert American inflexibility into Chinese strategic influence.

Trump prides himself on dealmaking. The essence of a durable deal is distinguishing indispensable safeguards from conditions that merely satisfy one party. Preventing proliferation is indispensable. Compelling normalization with Israel through a nuclear contract is not.

America’s safest course is to keep the kingdom’s program inside a rigorous American-led framework. Conditions that Riyadh cannot accept will not stop its nuclear development. They will only determine who builds it.